show, the notion of vulnerability is extremely broad and has been interpreted in a variety of ways by different disciplinary spheres. This identified the primary objective she intended to pursue, an aim she has reiterated in the essay presented here (Fineman, 2008 (Fineman, , 2012 It should also be stressed that, unlike the principle of equality, wherever the lexicon of vulnerability has been put into operation it has contributed to focusing attention exclusively on the subject defined as vulnerable. In so doing, this terminology has had two main effects: first, it has led to an As it has been implemented thus far, therefore, the vulnerability lexicon is not altogether unconvincing.
However, this in no way implies that the notion of vulnerability is somehow lacking in substantial theoretical and practical relevance.
Indeed, the problematic aspects mentioned above seem to derive specifically from the use of this notion in its "subjectivist" sense, both when it is understood as "particular" (only some people are vulnerable) and when it is instead proposed in a universalist sense (we are all vulnerable).
The "promises" of vulnerability would seem to disintegrate, in fact, when the vulnerability-subject pairing becomes entangled in a bottomless theoretical vortex.
It is worth mentioning, moreover, that until now the two perspectives (one philosophical and the other legal) outlined above only agree about this particular point: we need to redefine the subject of law by "breaking it down" (if the vision is subjectivistparticularist) or "reconfiguring it" (if the vision is instead subjectivist-universalist) on the basis of his/her (particular or universal)
vulnerability. This point of convergence becomes even more problematic given that this "subjectivist" view of vulnerability appears to contribute to a series of legalpolitical setbacks which, as stated above, Indeed, thinkers as early as Thomas Hobbes 9 The notion of vulnerability as it appears in Hobbes' work is extremely complex: it comprises the approximate equality of human beings as well as their physical characteristics and exposure of violence performed by others, their aggressive and passionate natures, and the survival instinct. For a detailed reconstruction of these many aspects see Guaraldo, 2012 . 10 Hart writes that human vulnerability (by which he means only physical vulnerability) is an obvious truth that determines the most typical precept of all law: the prohibition against killing (Hart, 1961) . 11 See for example, the arguments made by legal philosophers who support the theory of law as a rule of force, according to which it is the punishment, and so the use of force, that confers the status of legality on rules. Regarding this point, see Kelsen, 1960 Kelsen, , 1966 Bobbio, 1970 Bobbio, , 1994 . See also Barberis' review of this discussion in Barberis, 2011. Overturning the paradigm would therefore serve to make explicit the fact that political and legal institutions are necessary 12 See the exemplary arguments made by Max Weber and, later, Norberto Bobbio on this issue. Regarding the sociological definition of a state, Weber wrote that: "[u]ltimately, one can define the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of physical force" (Weber, 1946) . Concerning the link between political power and force, Bobbio wrote that "political power [...] is based on the possession of the tools by which physical force is exercised (weapons of every kind and degree): it is coercive power in the strictest sense of the word" (Bobbio, 1999:105) . For a critique of the conceptualizations that have theorized, described and legitimized the constitutive relationship between violence/force and law, politics and power over time, in this case as well please see the volume by Olivia Guaraldo, 2012 . even today because we humans are vulnerable: in so doing, the political community would find renewed common ground in our shared condition of vulnerability, as Judith Butler suggests (Butler, 2004: 9; Cavarero, 2007: 31) artificial, and so on), pushing legal and political philosophy in particular to examine the new subjects currently exercising forms 15 In relation to the link between violence, force and power Hannah Arendt wrote: "violence is nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of power. 'All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence,' said C. Wright Mills, echoing, as it were, Max Weber's definition of the state as 'the rule of men over men based on the means of legitimate, that is allegedly legitimate, violence'" (Arendt, 1970: 27) . This would enable the theoretical discussion to escape from the current impasse in which it is lodged, an impasse which involves taking refuge in the vulnerability of the subject almost as if it were so impossible to re-consider force that we needed to instead necessary to "run for cover" by identifying who is "most vulnerable".
The re-emergence of the issue of vulnerability represents a means of recovering a reflection on the human condition that had gotten lost over the course of the centuries; the only way this reemergence will succeed in demonstrating its true importance and fulfilling the promises inherent in it, therefore, is if it generates an epic paradigm reversal that leads to the reconfiguration of violence/force (then and now) or the even more desirable outcome of a (highly difficult) transcendence of the conceptualization that casts violence/force as a necessary and constitutive element of institutions, politics and the law.
